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MOVING CEMETERIES TO BUILD LOW INCOME HOUSING-
A VIOLATION OF THE "RIGHT TO REST IN PEACE?"
INTRODUCTION
In the United States today there are approximately one-half million
acres of land being used for cemeteries.' Much of this land would be
more valuable if it were used for urban growth. Cemeteries that were
founded near cities have now been engulfed by the growth of the
community Some of our cities have no opportunity for growth. Not
only is New York hemmed in by surrounding communities, but with
Manhattan located on an island, it has no room for expansion. In
the midst of these cities, vast acreages that are being used for cemeteries
can be found. Due to the increase in population and the need for low
income housing, the feasibility of moving some cemeteries and once again
making this land productive to the living is being examined.
The purpose of this note is to discuss some of the problems involved
in using the power of eminent domain to move cemeteries in order to
make the land available for the construction of low income housing.
The constitutional issues involved in this project will also be discussed.
Some of the foreseeable problems are: 1) the land to be taken by eminent
domain is already being used for a "public use"; 2) religious problems
would arise if the cemetery is affiliated with a religious organization;'
3) consideration must be given to the supposed wishes of the deceased
and his next of kin; and 4) it must be determined whether the dead have
constitutional rights, and, if so, who has standing to raise those rights.
EMINENT DOMAIN
The power of eminent domain would have to be exercised by the
state in order to acquire cemetery land. Before the power of eminent
domain can be exercised, the reason for the taking must be shown to be
1. Exact statistics are unavailable, due to the fact that the United States Bureau
of Census groups the statistics for cemeteries with statistics for other land uses.
The American Association of Cemeteries and the National Association of Cemeteries
cannot provide exact statistics. However, the National Association of Cemeteries has
statistics from a "rough survey" taken in 1963, and at that time there were 590,000
acres of land being used for cemetery purposes.
2. City of New Orleans v. Christ Church Corp., 228 La. 184, 81 So. 2d 855
(1955); In re Board of St. Openings & Improvements, 133 N.Y. 329, 31 N.E. 102
(1892).
3. See generally Lane, The Position of Religion in Cases Concerning Burials
and Disinterments, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 260 (1955).
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a public purpose or public use.' One purpose of taking cemetery land
would be to build low income housing. It is well established that the
taking of land to build low income housing is a public use.' The fact
that the housing would be for a certain group of people would seem not
to make it any less of a public use. In Nashville Housing Authority v.
City of Nashville,' the Housing Authority wanted to appropriate land
to build low income housing. The Housing Authority requested a
declaratory judgment in order to affirm the validity and constitutionality
of Tennessee's "Slum Clearance Act."' While it is submitted that
moving cemeteries to build low income housing would not benefit only
certain individuals, the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated: "An enter-
prise does not lose the character of a public use because of the fact that its
services may be limited by circumstances to a comparatively small part
of the public."'
The taking of cemetery land to build low income housing would
present an added problem since the land is already being employed for a
public use. Therefore, the government would be taking land from one
public use and putting it to another. In Woodland School District v.
Woodland Cemetery Association,9 the school district sought to have a
cemetery moved so that the land could be used for school purposes. The
court believed that the issue to be resolved was whether a school use was
more necessary than a cemetery use. The cemetery was moved and the
school built. The question that must be answered here is whether low
income housing is more necessary to the public than cemeteries. Many
factors would enter into this decision; for instance, as cemetery land it is
not only unproductive to the plot owners, but causes loss of revenue to
local governments due to property tax exemptions which are given to
cemeteries."0 If the land were made available for low income housing, it
would be productive to the public once again, and if any excess land were
4. E.g., Westcott v. State Highway Comm'n, 262 N.C. 522, 527, 138 S.E.2d
133, 136 (1964). "The phrase 'eminent domain' by definition admits condemnor did
not own, but took or appropriated the property of another for a public purpose." Id.
at 527, 138 S.E.2d at 136.
5. Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal. 2d 437, 94 P.2d 794 (1939); People
v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953); Housing and Redevelopment
Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W.2d 673 (1959); Nashville Housing
Authority v. City of Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951).
6. 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951).
7. WILuIAMs TENN. CODE ANN. 3647.11 (1935), replaced by TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 13-807 (1956).
8. 192 Tenn. 103, 109, 237 S.W.2d 946, 950 (1951).
9. 174 Cal. App. 2d 243, 344 P.2d 326 (1959).
10. See generally Note, Special Treatment of Cemeteries, 40 S. CA. L. REV.
716 (1967).
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sold to private segments, it could be taxed and would serve as a basis for
revenue." Therefore, by condemning a cemetery to build low income
housing, not only are the people who will live in the housing benefited,
but the community as a whole will gain by putting the land back into a
productive state.
Woodland School District dealt with the "more necessary public
use" doctrine, and while the court admitted that the burial of the dead is
necessary, it was not shown to be a "more truly public use than the
intellectual development of our citizens." 12 If school purposes are a
"more truly public use" for land than the burial of the dead, it is sub-
mitted that low income housing is also a more necessary public use than
cemeteries. If we are to aid in the development of our society, we must
furnish citizens not only with proper schools, but with a decent place to
live.
It is well established that the courts will rely on the judgment of the
legislatures and will not overrule them without good cause. Housing
and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman"3 dealt with the appropria-
tion of a slum area and the subsequent sale of the land to a redevelop-
ment authority. The question of public use was raised and the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated:
It is within the province of the legislature to declare a
public use or purpose, subject to review by the courts, and such
determination by a legislative body will not be overruled by the
court except in instances where that determination is manifestly
arbitrary and unreasonable.' 4
Therefore, if the legislature decided that cemetery land should be
taken for the construction of low income housing, their decision that this
is a public use would not be overruled unless it was unreasonable. The
Greenman court felt that the term "public use" must be flexible and
change as civilization advances. The definition of "public use" may be
changing due to the tendency of people to crowd into large cities, and as
a result, the old concepts of what was a "public use" must be changed.
There would be constitutional issues involved in the use of the
11. There is a limit to the amount of parks, playgrounds, or public purposes
which any community may afford. Where a municipality has no further need
of property in a redevelopment area, there should be no reason why it should
not be sold, restored to productive use, and become tax-producing property.
Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 404, 96 N.W.2d
673, 681 (1959).
12. 174 Cal. App. 2d 243, 246, 344 P.2d 326, 327 (1959).
13. 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W.2d 673 (1959).
14. Id. at 402, 96 N.W2d at 679.
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power of eminent domain to move cemeteries. The first would be whether
such taking violates "due process."'" The taking of land by the power
of eminent domain requires payment of just compensation" and that the
taking be for a public use."r In Housing and Redevelopment Authority
v. Greenman," the court held that use of the power of eminent domain
and condemnation proceedings are "legislative rights of government."
The court went on to say that "[t]he only questions which are judicial
are the public use and adequacy of compensation."'" The condernnee
can waive his right to compensation by granting the land to the sove-
reign."0 This would not be a taking and would therefore require no
compensation.
Disinterment Generally
In certain cases, the religious implications of disinterment have
been given such consideration. For instance, in Jewish custom, once a
burial has taken place in consecrated ground, disinterment will be
allowed only under three circumstances: 1) the burial was temporary,
2) the grave is not safe or 3) the deceased is to be reinterred in Pales-
tine.2' A New York case involving disinterment from a Jewish cemetery
allowed it only after petitioners had submitted written permission from
an eminent rabbi.2 However, in a subsequent New York case, 8 the
court refused to follow the advice given by an eminent rabbi and allowed
disinterment so that the decedent could be buried next to his wife. The
court felt that "the laws and usages of the religious body must at times
be subordinated to the feelings of the survivors."24 The seeming incon-
gruity between these two New York cases can be explained by examining
the issues that each court believed important.
Courts seem to be in agreement that the basic questions to be given
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
17. Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W2d
673 (1959).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 402, 96 N.W.2d at 679.
20. The answer admitted the construction of the highway over petitioner's
Casino property. It denied petitioner was entitled to compensation because
he had by writing . . . granted respondent the right to construct and main-
tain the road.
Westcott v. State Highway Comm'n, 262 N.C. 522, 525, 138 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1964).
21. See generally S. GANZFRIED, CODE OF JEWISH LAw 105 (1928).
22. Raisler v. Krakauer Simon Schreiber Congregation, 47 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1944).
23. Application of Sherman, 107 N.Y.S2d 905 (1951), aff'd 279 App. Div. 872,
110 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1952), motion for leave to reargue and appeal denied, 279 App. Div.
919, 110 N.Y.S.2d 919, affd 304 N.Y. 745, 108 N.E.2d 613 (1952).
24. 107 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (1951).
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consideration when disinterment is contemplated are: 1) the interest of
the public, 2) wishes of the decedent, 3) the rights and feelings of spouse
or next of kin, 4) religious considerations and 5) whether the party
requesting disinterment had initially consented to the burial. While there
may be agreement as to the basic questions, the order of their importance
is not always the same. In Pettigrew v. Pettigrew," the wife of the
deceased wanted to move her husband's body from his father's family
plot to a plot purchased by her so they could be buried together. The
deceased's brother opposed disinterment, but the court ruled that the
wishes of the surviving spouse are paramount to those of the next of kin.
The Pettigrew court, in listing its considerations, placed the wishes of
the surviving spouse before the wishes of the deceased.26 Thus, by
assigning weights to the particular interest, the court can make whatever
decision it wishes. On similar facts, another court reached exactly the
opposite result and refused to allow disinterment.' The wife died a
Roman Catholic and was buried in a noncatholic cemetery which had had
its ground consecrated according to the rites of the Catholic Church.
When the husband wanted to have his wife's body moved to a plot where
he too could be buried, the court refused. It was decided that the wife
would prefer to remain in consecrated ground rather than to be moved
so that her husband could be buried beside her. Here the "wishes" of the
deceased were considered controlling.
There is an obvious feeling among some courts that disinterment
is not desirable. The Pettigrew court displayed its aversion to disinter-
ment by quoting "the imprecation on the tomb at Stratford, 'Curst be he
that moves my bones.' ,,2S In a more recent New Mexico case, a wife
wanted to move her husband's body to a place of her choosing. The court
decided that the wife would not be allowed to disinter her husband's
body because she had "consented and never objected to burial of his body
in the lot mentioned."' The court then disclosed to what length it would
go to prevent disinterment.
The fact that the accident of death struck not once but
twice if, indeed, not thrice in quick succession the ranks of
those disturbing the tomb of Tut-Ankh-Amen could afford
only proof certain to the superstitious that an evil fate awaited
25. 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904).
26. Id. at 319, 56 A. at 881.
27. In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189 (1891).
28. 207 Pa. 313, 318, 56 A. 878, 880 (1904).
29. Theodore v. Theodore, 57 N.M. 434, 259 P.2d 795 (1953).
30. Id. at 436, 259 P.2d at 796.
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those who dared disturb the sleep of the dead. While not
sharing their tortured ideas, yet strongly bound by judicial
precedent as we are, we decline to enter an order which would
unseal the tomb of this sleeping body. Let it sleep on wholly
oblivious to the turmoil that rages above it. Requiescat in
Pace! Let the tomb remain sealed and the judgment which
so directed it stand affirmed."'
Other courts have expressed similar views. In Currier v. Woodlawn
Cemetery," the court stated: "The quiet of the grave, the repose of
dead, are not lightly to be disturbed."8 In an opinion written by Justice
Cardozo while he was serving on the New York Court of Appeals,8" he
stated: "The dead are to rest where they have been lain unless reason of
substance is brought forward for disturbing their repose.""8 Before it will
be possible to move entire cemeteries for the purpose of building low
income housing, this emotional feeling against disinterment must be
overcome. It would have to be made apparent to the public that these
cemeteries would not be desecrated and the bodies discarded, but that
there are more efficient methods of preserving these bodies.8" Large
mausoleums could be built which might alleviate some of the emotional
problems that would arise.
Disinterment by Eminent Domain
One of the leading and much cited cases on the subject of disinter-
ment is In re Widening of Beekman Street."' After giving the back-
ground to disinterment, 8 the court summed up requirements for dis-
interment which are essentially followed today. The court ruled:
That the right to bury a corpse and to preserve its remains,
is a legal right, which the courts of law will recognize and protect.
That such right, in the absence of any testamentary
31. Id. at 439, 259 P2d at 798.
32. 300 N.Y. 162, 90 N.E.2d 18 (1949).
33. Id. at 164, 90 N.E2d at 19.
34. Yome v. Gorman, 242 N.Y. 395, 152 N.E. 126 (1926).
35. Id. at 403, 152 N.E. at 129.
36. About 2000 bodies an acre can be buried, while it is realistically estimated
that a mausoleum can accomodate 10,000 an acre. J. MiTFoan, THE AMERCAN WAY
OF DEATH 127-29 (1963).
37. 4 Bradf. Sur. 503 (N.Y. 1856).
38. In England and at common law, the problem of disinterment was handled
by the ecclesiastical courts. Due to the separation of church and state in America, there
was no ecclesiastical court and the cases were generally decided by courts of equity.
"[N]either a corpse, nor its burial, is legally subject to ecclesiastical cognizance, nor
to sacerdotal power of any kind." Id. at 532.
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disposition, belongs exclusively to the next of kin.
That the right to protect the remains includes the right
to preserve them by separate burial, to select the place of
sepulture, and to change it at pleasure.
That if the place of burial be taken for a public use, the
next of kin may claim to be indemnified for the expense of
removing and suitably re-interring their remains.8 9
With the construction boom that followed the industrial re-
volution in the United States, it was inevitable that cases would arise
from the taking of cemetery land by eminent domain. The street widening
was sanctioned in Beekrnan and the next of kin of the decedents were
compensated for removal and reinterment elsewhere. In a subsequent
New York case,4" the court of appeals decided that if land being used as
a cemetery were needed for other purposes, the power of eminent domain
could be used.4
In Pennsylvania, an attempt was made by the legislature to exempt
cemeteries from the power of eminent domain. The legislature, in 1849,
passed the following act:
It shall not be lawful to open any street, lane, alley or public
road through any burial ground or cemetery within this
commonwealth, any laws heretofore passed to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, that this section shall not extend
to the city or county of Philadelphia."2
In In re Legislative Route ioi8," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would not allow the highway department to appropriate cemetery land
in order to construct a highway. The state contended that it was exempt
from coverage of the Act since it, as a state, was not specifically mention-
ed. However, the court decided that since the power of eminent domain
is exclusively in the sovereign and can be delegated by it, the Act
would serve no purpose if it did not apply to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania managed to circumvent the Act, however,
39. Id.
40. In re Board of St. Openings & Improvements, 133 N.Y. 329, 31 N.E. 102
(1892).
41. The fact that lands have previously been devoted to cemetery purposes
does not place them beyond the reach of the power of eminent domain. That
is an absolute power, belonging to the sovereign, which can be exercised for
the public welfare whenever necessity for its exercise exists.
Id. at 333, 31 N.E. at 103.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 8 (1965).
43. 422 Pa. 594, 222 A.2d 907 (1966).
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by having the federal government condemn the cemetery land."
In United States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less, of Land, 5 a govern-
ment project had to condemn a cemetery which would be flooded as a
result of the construction of a dam. The condemnees argued that the land
was already devoted to a public use and it could not, therefore, be
condemned for another.4" The court rejected this argument and said that
if land already put to a public use were needed for a constitutional purpose,
condemnation would be allowed for "the achievement of such pur-
poses."4 7 The case was relitigated when it was found that the project
needed more land.48 In the second litigation, the condemnees contended
that the appropriation of cemetery land would violate Illinois laws dealing
with the protection of cemeteries."0 The court decided that since this was
not an unauthorized disinterment, it was not in violation of Illinois civil
or criminal laws.
Mannheimer v. Wolff"° emphasized the fact that there must be a
valid reason for disinterment. The plaintiff asked for disinterment be-
cause the grave decorations were not uniform as promised. The court in
this case was unwilling to allow disinterment as requested by the plaintiff.
In the opinion of the court, disinterment would not be allowed because
[i]t is the policy of the law except in cases of necessity or for
laudable purposes that the sanctity of the grave should be
maintained and that a body once suitably buried should remain
undisturbed, and a court will not order or permit a body to be
disinterred unless there is a strong showing that it is necessary
and that the interests of justice require it.5
Since cemeteries have been condemned, through the power of eminent
domain, for such purposes as building schools,5" roads,53 reservoirs"
and other uses,"5 it would seem that the power could be used to condemn
44. United States v. 17.0098 Acres of Land, 269 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
45. 28 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Ill. 1939).
46. See notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.
47. 28 F. Supp. 368, 373 (E.D. Ill. 1939).
48. United States v. 2.74 Acres of Land in Williamson County, 32 F. Supp. 55
(E.D. Ill. 1940).
49. Law of March 27, 1874, ch. 38 §§ 354, 355 (repealed 1961).
50. 38 Il. App. 2d 216, 187 N.E.2d 1 (1962).
51. Id. at 225, 187 N.E.2d at 6 (emphasis added).
52. Woodland School District v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n, 174 Cal. App. 2d
243, 344 P2d 326 (1959).
53. In re Legislative Route 1018, 269 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
54. United States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less, of Land, 28 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.
I11. 1939).
55. Pansing v. Miamisburg, 79 Ohio St. 430, 87 N.E. 1139 (1908) (public
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cemeteries so that low income housing could be built. Low income housing
falls within the definition of a public use," since it would result in
bettering society and giving the residents a better place to live. It would
be a "laudable purpose" and in "the interests of justice."
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Free Exercise of Religion
Just as the government cannot establish a state religion, it cannot
prevent someone from exercising the religion of his choice." The dif-
ficulty with moving whole cemeteries to put in low income housing would
be mainly with the members of the Roman Catholic and the Jewish
faiths. To both of these faiths, burial is a sacred right and a very important
part of their religion.
The first major case to deal with the free exercise clause of the first
amendment was Reynolds v. United States.8 This case dealt with a
member of the Mormon Church being prosecuted for polygamy. The
Supreme Court felt that making polygamy illegal may have been an
interference with the defendant's free exercise of religion; but the Court
determined that the good to society outweighted the possible infringe-
ment on the defendant's religious freedom. "Congress was deprived of
all legislative power over mere [religious] opinion, but was left free
to reach [religious] actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order."5 One possible use of this precedent would
be to contend that preventing low income housing by not allowing
disinterment and removal of cemeteries would be "subversive of good
order." However, if Congress can make illegal anything "in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order," it would seem that it should
have the power to promote the same. The building of low income housing
will be a promotion of "good order" by giving the people who would live
there a better environment in which to live.
In a case with similar facts, Davis v. Beason,"° the Court held that
a practice of a religious sect could be made illegal if the decision were for
the good of society.
The first amendment to the Constitution, in declaring that
building and parks); Laureldale Cemetery Co. v. Reading Co., 303 Pa. 315, 154 A.
372 (1931) (railroads).
56. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
57. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
58. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
59. Id. at 164.
60. 133 U.S. 333 (1889).
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Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or forbidding the free exercise thereof, was intended
to allow every one . . . to exhibit his sentiments in such form
of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal
rights of others. . . . It was never intended or supposed that
the amendment could be invoked as a protection against leg-
islation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good
order and morals of society.6'
The language in the Davis case that the free exercise of religion will be
allowed when it is not "injurious to the equal rights of others," seems
to support the proposition that when religious freedom is "injurious to
the equal rights of others," it will not be allowed. It would seem that if
someone could prevent the government from using cemetery land to
build low income housing for the poor, it would be "injurious to equal
rights." Therefore, it is submitted that everyone has a right to live in
a decent environment and the right to be free from high disease and
crime rates. The good to society in general by allowing people to move
out of the slums and into decent housing should outweigh the harm that
would result from interfering with religious freedom. The Davis case
also said that the first amendment could not prevent legislation dealing
with punishment of acts that would harm the "peace, good order and
morals of society." If this is true, the same thing should apply to legis-
lation promoting the "peace, good order and morals of society."
In Braunfeld v. Brown," the Supreme Court dealt with a "Sunday
Closing" law that a Jewish merchant contended violated his free exercise
of religion. The Court first decided that the "purpose" and "effect" of
the law was to promote a secular goal and that it only "indirectly"
restrained the plaintiff's free exercise of his religion. The test proposed by
the Supreme Court was as follows:
But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general
law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to
advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a
burden.8
According to the Braunfeld case, therefore, there are two criteria to
61. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
62. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
63. Id. at 607.
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avoid violating the free exercise clause of the first amendment. The
governmental action must first have only an "indirect" effect on religion,
and secondly, there must be no less burdensome way for the government
to accomplish its purpose." If a cemetery were moved to build low income
housing, the effect on religion would obviously be only indirect, for there
would be no intent to regulate religion itself. The question of whether
there is a less burdensome way to fulfill the purpose would be answered
in the negative. If the cemetery land is the only land available, there
would be no less burdensome alternative.
The argument might be advanced that disinterring the dead would
amount to the establishment of atheism. McGowan v. Maryland5
was similar to the Braunfeld case except that the plaintiff in McGowan
attacked the statute on the grounds that it constituted the establishment
of a religion. In discussing the "Sunday Closing" laws, the Supreme
Court stated that:
[T]hey are of a secular rather than of a religious character,
and that presently they bear no relationship to establishment
of religion as those words are used in the Constitution of the
United States."
If the program of moving cemeteries and building low income housing
is attacked as interfering with the free exercise of religion, or as
establishing a religion, the test would seem to be whether the purpose
and effect is directly or indirectly felt by religion. As long as the purpose
is secular and the effect is indirect, it would seem that first amendment
arguments are of no avail.
The Right To Be Let Alone
Justice Brandeis first set down his theory of the "right to be let
alone" in 1890.67 In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,"8 he
expressed it for the Court:
They sought to protect the Americans in their beliefs,
their thought, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred as against the Government, the right to be let alone
64. Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE
L.J. 77 (1970).
65. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
66. Id. at 444.
67. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
68. 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
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-the most comprehensive of rights and the most valued by
Civilized man."0
The question may arise whether the right to be let alone or the right
to privacy continues after death to become the "right to rest in peace."
In Ravellette v. Smith,"0 the plaintiff was the wife of the decedent. The
court rejected plaintiff's contention that taking a blood sample from her
husband after his death was a violation of any of his constitutional rights.
The law, frequently expressed, is that the rights guaranteed
by the search and seizure provisions of state and federal
Constitutions are personal rights. Decedent's rights, being per-
sonal, could not survive his death and cannot validly be urged
by plaintiff. The same reasoning applies to the asserted invasion
of decedent's privacy.'
Other cases seem to subscribe to this view,"2 and agree that when a
person dies his constitutional rights die with him. In Cordell v. Detective
Publications, Inc.,73 the court refused recovery to a mother, who was
suing for invasion of her deceased daughter's right to privacy, when the
"lurid account of the brutal murder of her teenage daughter"74 was
published. The court decided that even though the publication was with-
out the daughter's permission, it was "irrelevant since any right to
recovery ended with her death."75 The Cordell and the Ravellette cases
make it clear that the right to privacy not only does not continue after
death, but that no one has standing to raise a decedent's right.
In Ravellette, since there was a physical disturbance of the body, it
would seem that there is no "right to rest in peace." The government
can use the power of eminent domain and not worry about violating the
constitutional rights of the dead. It would seem that the law is well
settled that constitutional rights are "personal and cannot survive death."
All of the discussion by the courts that the "repose of the dead should not
be disturbed," and that the "tomb should remain sealed" is based on
either emotion or policy and not on constitutional law.
69. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
70. 300 F2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962).
71. Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
72. Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969) ; Gruschus
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965); Maritote v. Desilu Prods.,
Inc., 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. I11. 1964).
73. 419 F2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969).
74. Id. at 991.
75. Id. at 992.
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CONCLUSION
The problem of overcrowding due to the population increase is
becoming more acute every year. It is submitted that one method of
alleviating the problem would be to move entire cemeteries so that low
income housing could be constructed. Even after cemeteries are moved,
they must be reconstructed so as not to take more land than needed. The
obvious answer is in the use of the power of eminent domain. By using
the power it has, the government could put the land to a more efficient
use. 76
Since the government already has the power of eminent domain and
the law concerning disinterment was set out in 1856 in a case that
has been almost universally followed,77 there is apparently nothing to
prevent this "more necessary" use of cemetery land.
In some instances, consent to remove the body may be obtained from
the next of kin; where this can be done, the only compensation that the
government needs to give is that necessary to move and reinter the
body."' While the next of kin of the deceased may be able to demand
compensation, there seems to be no way for them to prevent disinterment
if the government can show that the power of eminent domain is being
used 1) in the public interest, 2) for a more necessary public use and 3)
to further secular goals which will have only an indirect effect on
religion. It would seem that on constitutional grounds the taking of
cemetery land to build low income housing would encounter no major
difficulties. Opponents could not prevent the taking either on the ground
that it violates the first amendment or that it is an invasion of the
deceased's "right to rest in peace."
We can only hope that in the future the government will use the
power that it has and furnish low income housing where it is needed.
Moreover, the location of any future cemeteries should be more closely
controlled. By proper planning, the problem could be avoided and there
would be no need for condemnation.
76. See note 36 supra.
77. In re Widening of Beekman St, 4 Bradf. Sur. 503 (N.Y. 1856).
78. Id. at 532.
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